# Election Contingency Planning: Resources & Strategies

Minnesota Election Emergency Planning Task Force September 3rd, 2015

- Case Study: Sandy 2012
- Contingency/Recovery Plans
- Use of Technology

Are there distinctions in your plan between local/state elections (that you have more control over) & a Federal Election (that will go on no matter what)?

# A "regular" election cycle is full of logistics, planning, and precise execution:







#### Officials brace for Sandy's effects on Election Day

Gregory Korte, USA TODAY



Bam Journal site AP)

STORY HIGHLIGHTS

· Federal disester director says impact on federal

· Local election officials have contingency plans for

stectronic sisting machines

election is possible

· Hurricane has already

7:54PM EDT October 30. 2012 - What already looked to be a historically close presidential contest now has a new and confounding variable. Hurricane Sandy

As the storm lashed the East Coast and Midwest with gale-force winds, tomential rain and flooding, election officials faced new challenges: power outages, floods and snowstorms that could hinder voting through Election Day.

"We are anticipating that, based on the storm, there could be impacts that would linger into next week and have impacts on the federal election.\* said Craig Fugate, director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. "It's really too early to say what will be the impacts of the storm, and that's why it's again important that we'll be supporting the governors' teams and their supervisors of election or secretaries of State as the determine what ... assistance they may need."



16 Com



- With the storm approaching the East Coast, voters showed out en masse to vote early (where available) and election officials scrambled to keep up, to expand access, and communicate with the public.
- Lack of infrastructure complicated all efforts.

- Many election officials spent the days leading up to the storm living in their offices and warehouses:
  - 1. To watch for possible water leakage and ensure ballot & equipment safety.
  - 2. Answer voter inquiries and maintain communication with the public.
  - 3. Many weren't sure if they left, if they would be able to get back to the office again...

- One Maryland official posted on Facebook that she was trying to decide if she should sleep with the verifiable paper ballots, or the electronic touchscreen voting machines!
- (She opted for her office.)



#### • Some polling locations were still without power on Election Day:





Other world: Meanwhile in Oceanside, Long Island, a displaced voter cast his ballot via cell phone light at the generator powered First United Methodist Church; many in the suburbs are still without power

- Sandy impacted Maricopa County, AZ voters because we sent first responders to the East Coast in the days following the hurricane.
- Not all of these voters had a chance to come to our office to cast an emergency ballot.
- Under current law, if they had not already voted early, they were unable to vote.





- We think this is a travesty.
- After the implementation of the MOVE Act, which allows for UOCAVA (military and overseas voters) to receive their ballots and balloting materials electronically, we now have the system in place to service these voters.
- Comprehensive plans should review options voters have assisting outside of the state.

The American Voting Experience: Report and Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Election Administration



"(T)he experience with Hurricane Sandy made it evident that states must be certain their laws are updated to establish clear procedures for the rescheduling or conduct of elections in the event of a natural disaster. They also must be updated to accommodate voting for first responders from outside the disaster areas and those who are unable to return to their jurisdiction for Election Day due to the emergency."



- This can happen by either:
  - Modifying existing federal law such as UOCAVA or HAVA, &/or
  - Changing language in statutes to expand the covered voter protections to first responders who are responding to a declared (either federal or another state's) state of emergency.









## **Other Potential Legislative Considerations:**

- Is there statutory authority to consolidate polling places into vote centers?
- How will ballots be processed if "out of precinct"? Is there legal allowance?
  - What portion of ballot counts,
  - Where (where cast or back in home precinct/jurisdiction),
  - How will tabulation occur to confine to only eligible races? (IE duplication to voter's correct ballot style or invalidating races not eligible for, etc.)

### **Other Potential Legislative Considerations:**

- Polling locations in Schools: required?
- Potential to have Election Day as a school-in service day:
  - Removes student security concerns
  - Lots of parking for voters
  - Use of large rooms (gyms, cafeterias, etc.) should need to consolidate arise

# Contingency/Recovery Plans



- Comprehensive plans consider:
  - Infrastructure & basic utilities which serve the community as a whole.
  - Election administrative processes—state and local roles and responsibilities (is there uniformity in process and understanding?).
- Resources available

- National Association of Secretaries of State 2014 Report
- NASS Task Force recommendations and can be found at <u>www.nass.org</u> :





NASS Task Force on Emergency Preparedness for Elections

Final Report and Recommendations

MORE



National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS)

#### State Laws & Practices for the Emergency Management of Elections

Report of the NASS Task Force on Emergency Preparedness for Elections February 2014

"State contingency plans and other materials shared by Task Force members are generally designed to provide guidance to local election officials in emergency situations. These materials address a number of potential topics and issues, including:

- Communications plans for emergency situations, including contact information for:
  - key staff,
  - local emergency management agencies,
  - law enforcement, fire, medical services,
  - utility providers,
  - election equipment vendors,
  - other election officials, etcetera.

- Procedures for informing voters and the news media of polling place changes and other announcements.
- Contingency paper ballots for touch-screen technology and contingency paper precinct registers for electronic poll books.





- Power outage procedures for polling places, including evaluation of polling place power needs for lighting and voting machines (e.g. determining necessary wattage), as well as access to (and procurement of) back-up power sources, such as generators.
- Polling place relocation instructions and lists of alternative polling locations.
- Evacuation procedures for bomb threats, fires, and other emergencies.

- Guidelines for managing poll worker shortages, including designating and contacting alternate poll workers.
- Procedures for securing voting machines and election materials in emergency situations."





- Cooperation among neighbors is key—particularly when media markets are shared and voters may not distinguish between variation in state laws and requirements.
- If all jurisdictions are reacting in a similar fashion then the message is consistent & correct.



FEMA offers free, online emergency management training courses as part of the Emergency Management Institute's Independent Study Program:

- incident management,
- disaster logistics,
- operational planning,
- emergency communications,
- continuity programs,
- integrated preparedness,
- hazard mitigation,
- public disaster communications and
- service to disaster victims.

# Congressional Research Service Report

# **CRS Report for Congress**

Received through the CRS Web

State Election Laws: Overview of Statutes Regarding Emergency Election Postponement Within the State

> L. Paige Whitaker Legislative Attorney American Law Division

- This report high lights the various ways state laws deal with emergency situations that occur during the election cycle.
- It was published in 2004—additional information on state legislation can be found at the National Conference of State Legislatures: <u>www.NCSL.org</u>

### **Election Assistance Commission**

- The EAC website offers a full chapter on contingency and disaster planning as well as a Quick Start Management Guide.
- www.eac.gov





AND DISASTER PLANNING

October 2007



#### • A resource listing is also available:

#### RESOURCES

- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Emergency Preparedness and Response: http://emergency.cdc.gov/
- Disability Preparedness Resource Center: http://www.disabilitypreparedness.gov/
- Federal Emergency Management Agency: http://www.fema.gov/
- Ready Campaign: www.ready.gov
- List of State offices and agencies of emergency management: http://www.fema.gov/about/contact/statedr.shtm
- Disaster Help: https://www.disasterhelp.gov/index.shtm
- Making Community Emergency Preparedness and Response Programs Accessible to People with Disabilities: http://www.ada.gov/emergencyprep.htm
- Stoneburner, Gary, Alice Goguen, and Alexis Feringa. *Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems, Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology* (Special publication 800-30). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. July 2002. (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-30/sp800-30.pdf)

#### EAC

# • One way to approach planning is to look at all possible contingencies and change factors & develop responses

#### TABLE 11.1: EXAMPLES OF CONTINGENCIES AND CHANGE FACTORS

Contingencies	Change Factors
Fire in voting system warehouse	Election office is relocated
Severe snow storm (blizzard) on Election Day	Reduction in number of staff members
Electrical damage to office computers during peak voter registration weeks prior to election	Purchase of new voting system
Poll workers do not show up at their assigned polling place	New State law requires poll workers receive 8 hours of training prior to an election
Polling place runs out of provisional ballots	Office budget is reduced by 7%

# Mitigations can be cause-contingent. Harris Co, TX in 2010 is a good example:



# The Harris Numbers (& Lesson):

- Fire consumed their warehouse 51 days before early voting was scheduled to start.
- It was a total loss. \$43M loss.
- 30% of the voting equipment they used in their November election came from other TX counties, balance from vendor.



# They now store half of their equipment behind a fire wall:



## Maricopa County, AZ

- We chose to not focus on the triggering event of a disaster, but the impact.
- Would it matter if it was a fire, flood, explosion (etc.) that destroys a warehouse? Or just that the warehouse is gone & "what-cha-gonna-do"?
- WHEN events happen is almost as important in planning, as WHERE something might occur.



#### Disaster Recovery

Plan Maricopa County

Maricopa County Elections Department



#### **Chronological Order of Events**

- 90 Days out from Election Day ......01-12
- 30 Days out from Election Day ......13-30
- Weekend before Election Day ......50-66
- Post Election Day ......82-87

#### **Impacted Facility Listing**

• MCTEC	
• Downtown	
• Mesa	

# Maricopa County, AZ

- The Impacted Facility section was just for our main locations, however there were other places considered in the chronology:
  - Single polling place
  - Multiple polling places
  - Print vendor
  - Satellite voting locations
  - Post-election ID verification sites
  - Hand-count audit facility
  - Election night receiving site locations

### Maricopa County, AZ

- Considering what materials are present at each stage of the election really triggers your response to that event.
- Warehouse catastrophe a month before the election is very different from the day before.
- We then listed each division in the department and had them consider what impact it would have on them as well as how they would recover.

#### **Disaster Impacting MCTEC--** Supplies are still in house:

- •
- **BTC** (All election coding and testing completed) Contact City of Phoenix to coordinate the use of tabulation equipment. Recreate the logic and accuracy test deck. Load County election program and schedule logic and accuracy testing. Implement central counting procedures for precincts that do not have tabulation equipment. Contact Print Vendor to provide ballot overages for precincts that ballots were destroyed. Contact vendor to replace proprietary hardware and tabulation equipment. 0
- 0
- 0
- 0

#### **Early Voting** ٠

- Supplies for early voting would be in-house at this point in addition to Ballot returns. Ο
- UNUSED Ballots Not possible to recover immediately from total EV ballot loss. Will have to reprint to utilize actual 0 card stock ballots but EV schedule would be compromised.
- Paper ballots could be utilized which can be produced at a faster pace than card stock ballots. Will have to establish 0 several dup boards upon return of these paper ballots. EV Packet files are on the network so recovery is immediate.
- Ο
- Packet inserts and artwork are saved on the network for immediate distribution to reprographics for re-print. Ο
- Mailer envelope artwork saved off site at Print Vendor for immediate reprint. Ο
- Possible to split EV Insert and mailer envelope stock between locations (MCTEC & Print vendor's) to insure viable amounts are available to allow for continuation of the process while backup product is being produced. 0
- RETURNED BALLOTS: Ballots already returned but not tabulated would need to be re-mailed. Time constraints my not permit for such re-mailing so it may be necessary to make a public announcement to have "all voters vote at the polling place" on Election Day. Need to issue fire retardant bags to store voted EV ballots
- Ο
- AS AN EV SITE: Jurisdictional Ballots Not possible to recover immediately from total EV ballot loss. Will have to 0 reprint to utilize actual card stock ballots but EV schedule would be compromised. Majority of EV ballots will be housed at print vendor. Supplies from other EV sites could be utilized until such time as replacement ballots completed.
- AS AN EV SITE: Voted ballots already returned but not tabulated would need to have voter contacted. Time constraints my not permit for re-mailing so it may be necessary to make a public announcement to have "all voters vote at the polling place" on Election Day.

#### Appendixes

• Template/Guide of Voter Notification Mailer	123
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#### Maricopa County, AZ

#### Facility Emergency Kit

Each facility has a small suitcase on wheels for evacuations complete with:

- 🖌 First aid kit
- ✓ Paper copy of Disaster Recovery Plan
- 🖌 Bottled water
- 🖌 Flash light
- ✓ Reflective vests
- 🖌 Hand-powered radio
- 🖌 Small tool kit

# Tools & Technology

#### **Resource Allocation Tools**



the Presidential Commission on Election Administration \* \* \* ---

The Commission News Events Materials & Research Public Comments Videos

See the Toolkit

Contact | 🔰

Pursuant to Executive Order 13639, the Presidential Commission on Election Administration has submitted its Report and Recommendations to the President.



**Download the Full Report** 

#### The Commission's key recommendations call for:



Modernization of the registration process through continued expansion of online voter registration and expanded state collaboration in improving the accuracy of voter lists

Measures to improve access to the poils through multiple opportunities to vote before the traditional Election Day and the selection of suitable, well-equipped polling place facilities, such as schools



State-of-the-art techniques to assure efficient management

Reforms of the standard-setting and certification process for

#### Election Toolkit

Tools that can assist local election officials allocate Election Day resources to avoid long lines at the polling place and transition to online voter registration.

#### CALCULATORS

Line Optimization and Poll Worker Management

Poll Worker and Machine Optimization

#### Line Optimization

**ONLINE VOTER REGISTRATION** 

**OVR** Tools

Platform for Designated Partners

Open Source Voter Registration Software

Visit the Voting Technology Project

#### Line Optimization

Mark Pelczarski

Expe	cted voters 500	Check-in	stations 2	<ul> <li>Votir</li> </ul>	ig stations	5 <b>▼</b> P	oll is ope	n 7:00am	▼ to 8:0	)pm 💌		
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7am	8am 9am	10am	11am	12pm	1pm	2pm	3pm	4pm	5pm	6pm	7pm	8pm
		Avg.	Voting station	wait	Avg. C	heck-in wait		Maximum/n	ninimum wai	t		
				R	un Simulatio	n						



## Example

- Estimated 800 voters
- Polls open from 6 AM to 7 PM
- Standard 2 check-in points
- Standard voting stations of 8
- Time to check in takes 90 seconds
- Time to vote ballot averages 10 minutes
- What is the wait time going to be?

#### Change in check-in process adding 30 seconds:





The addition of a single check-in station negates the hour long wait at the end of the day.

#### Change in # voting stations





## Use of Technology: Pro

**Electronic Pollbooks** 

- Epollbooks are more adaptable and easily updated in a changing environment.
- If polling locations are modified to accommodate more voters an EPB can offer expansive rolls.
- They aren't reliant upon a print vendor (who is potentially also impacted).

# Use of Technology: Con

- Reliance upon electricity can be problematic.
- Connectivity to an operational VR system is necessary.

#### **Electronic Pollbooks**

## Use of Technology: Pro

#### Early Voting

- Offering voters expanded voting opportunities such as early voting allows for voters to react to environmental factors:
  - By voting at alternative sites they may not normally be assigned to.
  - Accommodates a moving population.

### Use of Technology: Con

#### Early Voting

- If relying on USPS—they too can be impacted.
- Connectivity challenges.
- Transportation of supplies and materials can be problematic.



## Use of Technology: Pro

New Voting Technologies

- Some of the new voting systems allow for ballot marking on the voter's personal devices—this allows for distribution away from a central location and also relieves the pressure of providing ALL of the ballot marking devices.
- Allows for voter-specific ballot-style delivery.
- More nimble than traditional systems.
- Every state already has a system in place to provide Military and Overseas voters with a ballot electronically.

### Use of Technology: Con

- Voters may also be impacted by lack of electricity and/or internet services.
- Most statutes don't allow for ballot returns this way so would still need a traditional polling location for the casting of the ballot. (They had this issue in NJ during Sandy.)
- There are security concerns, but several states have allowed UOCAVA voters to return ballots electronically for years and AK allows all voters to do this if they so choose.

## Use of Technology: Pro

**Online Voter Registration** 

- Enables an impacted population the ability to update where they are in order to get information—
  - Addresses: where are they now?
  - Polling location changes
- Reduction of office time spent keying this information allows for more time to react to the triggering event.

#### Use of Technology: Con

**Online Voter Registration** 

- Reliance on electrical grid.
- Connectivity from both the voter perspective as well as state & local administrators.





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